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ABSTRACT 
Lay participation is a conventional, but little examined, aspect of Alaska’s 
administrative law tribunals. The legal community is sometimes suspicious of 
lay members’ competence, leading to a trust gap between legal professionals 
and their lay counterparts. With the goal of bridging this divide and shedding 
light on participants’ perspective of serving on tribunals, this Article reviews 
the first survey study of Alaska lay members on state adjudicatory panels. 
Among other things, the survey focused on tribunals’ gender and ethnic 
diversity, members’ understanding of fairness and impartiality duties, their 
training, and the relationship lay participants had with administrative law 
judges. As detailed within this Article, the survey’s results offer important 
findings that can help the legal community understand its interaction with 
lay participants. The Article also considers starting points for improving 
involvement on tribunals by lay members, who altogether appear to take their 
roles seriously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative tribunals, which often consist primarily of lay (non-
lawyer) members, exercise many powers once held exclusively by 
courts.1 This makes many lawyers uneasy. Historically, lawyers have 
been suspicious of lay engagement in legal decision-making by juries2 
and by lay judges.3 Even today, the argument that non-lawyers are 
constitutionally unfit to interpret law continues to be made in Alaska 
 
 1.  See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From 
Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 770 (1986) 
(explaining that Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), “allowed non-article III 
tribunals substantial powers, even in the formerly sacrosanct domain of private-
rights cases”). Since Crowell, although issues have arisen over whether particular 
types of rights are subject to administrative adjudication, the fundamental 
acceptance of agencies engaging in judicial functions has survived. See id. at 859 
(“[W]hen Congress creates an interest, short of a full-fledged, vested, old-style 
property right, it has great power to use potent non-article III tribunals for 
adjudication.”). See also, e.g., Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 
27, 40 (Alaska 2007) (“The constitution grants the legislature and the executive 
broad power to organize administrative bodies. We have also recognized that 
the legislature has constitutional power to allocate executive department 
functions and duties among the different administrative bodies within state 
government.”). 
 2.  See Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases – A Study 
in Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 884 (1934) (“Whatever the political, 
psychological or jurisprudential values of the jury as an institution may be, its 
use in the civil litigation covered by this study is certainly not impressive. The 
picture seems to be that of an expensive, cumbersome and comparatively 
inefficient trial device employed in cases where exploitation of the situation is 
made possible by underlying rules.”). See also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 
101 (1895) (“Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be 
established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as 
expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves.”); United 
States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14545) (Story, J.) 
(“Every person accused as a criminal has a right to be tried according to the law 
of the land, the fixed law of the land; and not by the law as a jury may 
understand it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or accidental mistake, 
to interpret it.”). 
 3.  See Chester H. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 
CAL. L. REV. 118, 123 (1927) (arguing that even if lay justices of the peace were 
men of intelligence and moral character, “many would hesitate to submit the 
interpretation of the law and statutes to such a court”). For more recent criticism, 
see, for example, Benjamin Will Bates, Exploring Justice Courts in Utah and Three 
Problems Inherent in the Justice Court System, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 731, 773 (2001) 
(suggesting that there is greater potential for ethical abuse and ex parte contacts 
when judges are not lawyers); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Disorder in the People’s 
Court: Rethinking the Role of Non-Lawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court Civil 
Cases, 29 N.M. L. REV. 119, 130–31 (1999) (arguing that having non-lawyers 
adjudicate civil matters governed by substantive and procedural legal rules is 
anachronistic, particularly in urban areas). 
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courts.4 There is no doubt that this distrust flows both ways. Lawyers 
are accustomed to facing hostility toward their profession,5 but recent 
political discourse based on distrust of the legal profession illustrates 
how far the gap between lay citizens and lawyers has grown.6 
As decision-making bodies, jurors have been attacked as 
incompetent, illogical, unable to follow the law, too independent, and 
inclined to be swayed by passion or prejudice.7 However, over forty 
years of research demonstrates that United States juries generally 
function well as group decision-makers.8 A jury’s transience and 
independence—meeting once as a body in a single case and deciding 
facts without the judge present—is the foundation for claims that the 
jury strengthens democracy.9 Jury service is recognized as a right that 
 
 4.  See, e.g., Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp., 167 P.3d at 41 (explaining that 
appellants argued that the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, 
composed of a majority of non-lawyers, could not constitutionally make 
decisions that had the force of legal precedent). 
 5.  See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark 
Glass, 75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 389 (1987) (arguing that the special hatred of lawyers 
in American popular culture derives from lawyers “embod[ying] the tension we 
all experience between the desire for an embracing and common community 
and the urge toward individual independence and self-assertion”). 
 6.  Distrust of the legal profession was a recurrent theme as two 
constitutional amendments directed toward lawyers’ role in government 
proceeded through the 28th Alaska Legislature. Testimony presented by 
proponents of H.R.J. Res. 33, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014) (constitutional 
amendment to increase number of members on the judicial council, a mixed 
body of lawyers and non-lawyers responsible for screening and nominating 
judicial applicants) and H.R.J. Res. 18, 28th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2014) 
(constitutional amendment related to the attorney general office) illustrated this 
widening gap. The assumption underlying the distrust is that lawyers are the 
opponents of citizens, or the opponents of Alaskans, instead of being Alaska 
citizens themselves, who intermeddle between citizens rather than serve their 
interests. 
 7.  See, e.g.,  State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 396–97 (Alaska 1999) (“[T]he Frye 
rule was intended to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence because: (1) lay 
jurors can be overly impressed by science; (2) lay jurors lack the capacity to 
evaluate scientific evidence critically; and (3) lay jurors are likely to give ‘junk 
science’ more weight than it deserves.”). Here, the Alaska Supreme Court was 
quoting State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 779 (Nebraska 1994). 
 8.  For a concise response to the major criticisms of the civil jury based on 
empirical studies, see Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An 
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 898 (1998) (“Research findings bearing 
on the performance of civil juries yield little support for the extreme claims 
charging juries with poor and irresponsible performance. Trial judges agree with 
jury decisions most of the time and strongly support the jury system.”). See 
generally NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007) 
(providing a detailed synthesis of modern research on juries as effective 
decision-makers, and concluding with a verdict strongly in favor of the 
American jury). 
 9.  See Richard O. Lempert, The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-
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cannot be denied on the basis of race or sex.10 Community participation 
is “critical to public confidence” in the fairness of courts.11 Indeed, 
several recent studies of jurors demonstrate the positive impact that jury 
service has on subsequent civic engagement.12 
Juries are not the only place that lawyers and lay citizens meet as 
legal decision-makers. The mixed administrative tribunal represents a 
singular arrangement where lawyer and lay citizen work together and 
share roles, instead of performing the strictly separate roles of lay jury 
and lawyer judge. Unlike juries, administrative tribunals are not 
transient bodies. Their members are appointed for years, rather than the 
duration of a single case. Further, tribunals generally are not meant to be 
representative of large communities,13 like juries are. Rather, tribunal 
members are meant to represent a small community within a particular 
field,14 and they are expected to learn the law of their tribunal and to 
develop its interpretation. Most importantly, tribunal members only 
have the power of independent deliberation when they are constituted 
as reviewing bodies. Most administrative tribunals are mixed; they share 
deliberation with a professional administrative law judge, who may be a 
voting member, an advisor, or a presenter of information. 
The deliberative power of the tribunal is often shared with a 
professional administrative law judge (ALJ), who can be a voting 
member, an advisor, or a presenter of information. Professional, law-
trained judges have “status, training, skill, and experience on their side,” 
and therefore, in these mixed courts, they may disproportionately 
influence the tribunal’s decision-making.15 Thus, mixed tribunals are 
 
Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477, 481 (2007) 
(“Jury systems, once in place, support democratic forms of government, because 
they are uncongenial to authoritarian rule.”). 
 10.  Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986); JEB v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 11.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
 12.  JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION 
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 174–75 tbl.9.1 (2010). 
 13.  Exceptions are those statewide boards or commissions that require 
appointment based solely on geographic or population distribution, such as the 
Local Boundary Commission, ALASKA STAT. § 44.33.810 (2012). 
 14.  See, e.g., § 08.04.020 (requiring five members of the Board of Public 
Accountancy to be certified public accountants); § 08.62.010 (requiring two 
members of the Board of Marine Pilots to be licensed pilots and two to be 
managers of vessels); § 08.64.010 (requiring five members of the State Medical 
Board to be physicians “residing in as many separate geographical areas of the 
state as possible”); § 15.13.020 (requiring the Alaska Public Offices Commission 
to have two appointees from “each of the two political parties whose candidate 
for governor received the highest number of votes”). 
 15.  See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and 
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targets of two criticisms. First, lay tribunal members are viewed as 
irrational or prejudiced because the tribunals are intransient; and 
second, because lay members are not trained in the law, they might be 
dominated by more “competent” law-trained judges. Lay members in 
tribunals are not without their defenders, but the defense is often based 
on a latent contribution to the tribunal—by representing a “lay” view, 
they make the “professionals” do a better job of decision-making.16 Even 
among defenders, however, the abilities of lay members are 
challenged.17 
This Article does not review the scope of decisional authority or 
examine the decisions of any particular tribunal;18 rather, it focuses on 
the implications of some of the findings of the author’s anonymous 
survey research. Instead of speculating about the thinking of lay 
members, or examining theories of social behavior in hypothetical 
deliberations, the author asked Alaska’s lay tribunal members for their 
thoughts. How representative of their community are they? Does the 
statutory mandate that a professional judge must preside over 
administrative hearings mean that the lay members are subservient to 
the professional in deliberation? Do tribunal lay members see 
themselves as equal or subordinate to the professional judge? What do 
they think about their legal role and the law? What happens when they 
perceive that we, members of the legal community, treat them without 
respect? Without diminishing the importance of lay expertise, what do 
lay members believe is needed to improve their participation in 
administrative justice? 
 
the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 547, 587 (1997) 
(hypothesizing on the persuasive power of professional judges mixed with lay 
judges in the American court system). 
 16.  See, e.g., MARK DAVIES, MEDICAL SELF REGULATION: CRISIS AND CHANGE 
270 (2007) (“Lay members help us look at matters from another perspective, and 
make us aware of the needs and concerns of the public. . . .”). 
 17.  See Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 914, 918–19 (W.D. Mich. 1981) 
(“[W]hile in some instances, lay members of the public serve on executive 
boards of hospitals, the determination of the medical competence of a physician 
is peculiarly within the domain of the medical profession.”). 
 18.  Practice before administrative agencies, agencies’ authority to make 
particular legal decisions, and the political considerations in “rule-making” or 
regulation have been thoroughly studied and discussed elsewhere. See generally 
Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good 
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997); Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. 
Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of 
Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 243 (2012); Yair Sagy, A Triptych of Regulators: A 
New Perspective on the Administrative State, 44 AKRON L. REV. 425 (2011); Mark 
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002); Anthony Vitarelli, Note, Happiness 
Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115 (2010). 
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The first part of this Article briefly introduces the reader to mixed 
tribunals and potential sources of internal conflict. The next part 
describes the survey and its respondents, including the geographic 
diversity of responses. Part Three of this Article describes in detail the 
survey’s findings. Specifically, it addresses the distribution of women 
and minority members and perceptions of diversity among members 
and perceptions of tribunal fairness, findings on members’ 
understandings of their duties of impartiality and fairness, members’ 
desire for training in decision-making and respect for their role, barriers 
to active participation, and the members’ understanding of their role as 
adjudicators and their relationship to the professional judge. In the 
conclusion, the Author presents suggestions for conduct and regulatory 
changes. An appendix of charts shows the numbers and percentages of 
responses to certain questions on the survey. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Alaska’s Mixed Administrative Tribunals 
The creation of administrative tribunals in the United States was 
part of a move toward “expert” decision-making during the Progressive 
Era.19 Soon after, however, the impact of the Great Depression resulted 
in “a host of zealous lawyers and academics descend[ing] upon the 
nation’s capitol with a strong belief in the inevitability and viability of 
centralized economic planning” in support of new regulatory 
measures.20 Members of government boards and commissions were 
intended to serve as non-lawyer experts, regulating a particular industry 
and enforcing rules in small but complex fields, free from partisan 
political considerations.21 Now well-established as an arm of modern 
government, quasi-judicial administrative agencies are even recognized 
in the Alaska Constitution.22 
In Alaska, as in rest of the United States, mixed administrative 
 
 19.  Jerry Mitchell, Representation on Government Boards and Commissions, 57 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 160, 160–66 (1997). 
 20.  STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 30 (2d ed. 1985). 
 21.  Id. at 31 (“[D]efenders of the administrative process sought to justify the 
agencies’ combination of functions and to minimize procedural formalities and 
judicial review, contending that the salvation of the economy required 
administrative controls involving expert knowledge, mixed power, and 
discretionary management analogous to that exercised by business leaders.”). 
 22.  See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 22 (providing that “[r]egulatory, quasi-
judicial, and temporary agencies may be established by law and need not be 
allocated within a principal department”). 
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tribunals at the state and local levels allow citizens without legal 
training to bring their expertise and community experience to bear on 
decisions affecting a wide variety of legal rights and claims.23 In these 
tribunals, the lay members of government boards and commissions may 
be joined by an ALJ in the decision-making process. When 
administrative tribunals include a professional judge in deciding legal 
disputes or rights, they are mixed administrative tribunals.24 Unlike 
administrative adjudication that is delegated to a single ALJ and 
reviewed by a single executive, mixed administrative tribunals provide 
an opportunity for direct citizen participation in justice, which has 
diminished in civil disputes as cases are removed from the jury’s reach 
by transfer to administrative proceedings, arbitration, and court-
sponsored mediation.25 
Unlike the jury, whose members are drawn by lot from the 
community, membership in tribunals is based on a theory of status 
representation.26 Status representation states that when people are 
chosen because they are members of a group, they will act as members 
of the group would act. Status representatives include members 
appointed from specific geographic areas, minority populations, 
commercial industries, or professions. These appointments are often 
 
 23.  Most government boards and commissions perform a number of 
different functions. They manage public enterprises, such as schools; they 
regulate industries and professions in the public good, such as utilities and 
medical professions; they inform and advise on public policy, such as land 
development and conservation; and, as “quasi-judicial bodies” they decide legal 
disputes and rights within the scope of their statutory authority. GALE GROUP, 8 
WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 199–200 (2d ed. 2005). Regardless of 
other functions, when they decide legal disputes between parties, or the legal 
rights of parties, they are “adjudicatory administrative tribunals” or simply 
“administrative tribunals.” Id. at 199. 
 24.  The degree of formal involvement between the professional judge and 
the tribunal’s lay citizen members varies. Usually the professional judge 
presides over a hearing with the tribunal’s citizen members present or conducts 
a hearing alone on behalf of the tribunal. In deliberation, the professional judge 
may: participate in deliberation and cast an equal vote on the decision; be 
present in deliberation only to advise on points of law without voting on the 
decision; summarize the evidence and be present in deliberation to advise, 
without voting on the decision; or summarize the evidence, present a draft 
decision, be present in deliberation to advise, but not vote on the final decision. 
Kristin S. Knudsen Latta, Citizen Adjudicators Lay Members of Alaska’s Mixed 
Administrative Tribunals as Lay Judges in Mixed Courts: A Study of 
Participation, Attitude and Recruitment 4 (Dec. 2012) (Masters Thesis, 
University of Nevada), available at http://gradworks.umi.com/15/22/1522070 
.html. 
 25.  See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 8, at 63 (noting trend away from jury 
trials with the growth of administrative adjudication and alternative dispute 
resolution). 
 26.  See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 162. 
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termed “designated seats.”27 Status representation by “public” or 
“consumer” members generally does not affect the way decisions are 
made.28 Instead, public and consumer appointments represent a 
symbolic legitimation of the boards’ and commissions’ decisions 
through public representation.29 Thus, tribunals may derive some 
degree of legitimacy through being seen as representative of the larger 
community, even when they are not selected randomly. 
B.  The Conflicts Built Into Administrative Tribunals 
As a result of financial and resource pressures, mixed 
administrative tribunals tend to be a neglected part of government. 
Executive agencies find it time-consuming and expensive to gather and 
train unpaid part-time members for hearings. Moreover, confirmation 
authorities, especially legislatures, lack adequate review time in a busy 
legislative session. These problems combine to make establishing mixed 
administrative tribunals especially difficult. 
These problems compound to make the establishment of mixed 
administrative tribunals especially difficult. Even after established, 
conflicts persist between administrative agencies, lay members of 
administrative tribunals that monitor, curb, or enforce agency action, 
and the judiciary that reviews agency action and tribunal decisions. 
Judicial review of agency action operates as a brake on administrative 
discretion, but from the agency viewpoint, judicial mandates may 
hinder the agency’s operations and the tribunal’s efficiency by creating 
delay and requiring cumbersome procedural requirements. Conflicts 
can also arise because of how the tribunal functions. First, lay citizen 
participation may encourage negotiated deals and settlements rather 
than independent consideration of disputes, which undermines the rule 
of law.30 And second, tribunal members can compete for power within 
 
 27.  Knudsen Latta, supra note 24, at 2. 
 28.  Research examining decision patterns before and after inclusion of 
“public” or “consumer” representative members showed little change associated 
with the presence of these members. Saundra. K. Schneider, Influences on State 
Professional Licensure Policy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 479, 483 (1987). However, some 
studies suggest that consumer representation does impact licensing board rule-
making by reducing barriers to competition. See Elizabeth Graddy & Michael B. 
Nichol, Public Members on Occupational Licensing Boards: Effects on Legislative 
Regulatory Reforms, 55 S. ECON. J. 610, 623 (1989). 
 29.  See Stefan Machura, Silent Lay Judges—Why Their Influence in the 
Community Falls Short of Expectations, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769, 770 (2011) 
(explaining that “lay participation is seen as a source of legitimacy for the courts 
and the legal system”). 
 30.  Sidney A. Shapiro, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: A 
Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L. J. 89, 92–93 (1996). 
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the tribunal. 
Most administrative tribunals still rely on member expertise and 
community experience to lend accuracy to administrative tribunal 
decision-making and to represent regulated interests.31 However, this 
expertise is less important after Goldberg v. Kelly32 and Mathews v. 
Eldridge.33 These cases raised the ALJ to a dominant role on 
administrative tribunals by elevating the importance of legal procedure 
over expertise. 
C.  Lack of Recorded Opinions 
It would be easier to know what lay members think about law and 
their role in the legal system if they all recorded written opinions like 
judges do. Unfortunately, lay members leave few traces of their ideas 
concerning their proper role on the tribunal or their relationship with 
professional ALJs. Most members of administrative tribunals make no 
individual record as decision-makers; usually, the writing of the tribunal 
opinion is delegated to the professional judge or a staff lawyer. As a 
result, the voice of the tribunal is the ALJ.  
A recurrent argument by some judges posits that the subject matter 
expertise offered by citizen members constitutes insider knowledge that 
can further diminish the role of lay member expertise. “Insider 
knowledge may strengthen agency performance[,] but it threatens 
fundamental fairness. If relevant to a decision, this knowledge . . . must 
be tested by an independent judge, not by an insider.”34 Lay expertise, 
these judges claim, is not required to analyze facts and weigh them 
appropriately.35 However, increased involvement by well-trained, 
professional judges, as opposed to potentially biased insiders “produces 
a different emphasis . . . . The quality of the work, rather than the 
outcome, becomes more important.”36 
Without the mantles of expertise, community experience, or 
community representation, lay members are vulnerable to attacks as 
unnecessary holdovers of a bygone era, unqualified to make modern 
legal decisions. Professional judges and attorneys will tend to 
 
 31.  Teachers and superintendents are represented on teacher licensing 
boards; physicians are represented on medical boards; and regional 
representatives from different areas of a state are required by other boards. 
 32.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 33.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 34.  John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to 
Critics, 24 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES J. 231, 238 (2004). 
 35.  Id. at 237–38. 
 36.  Id. at 241. 
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discourage active lay member participation if they see the lay members’ 
contributions as a threat to fairness, or believe the lay members lack 
confidence. If lay members do not participate actively, their presence on 
the administrative tribunal is seen as less valuable. If lay members 
perceive that their contribution is devalued, they themselves may lose 
faith in the fairness and legitimacy of the tribunal. Alternatively, they 
may consider their presence alone to be an adequate contribution to the 
tribunal by promoting the democratic legitimacy of the tribunal’s 
decisions. In response to the rising status of the professional ALJ, lay 
members may have assumed the role of impartial jurors. This state of 
affairs devalues lay members’ contributions to legal decision-making in 
an administrative context. Therefore, members of the legal community 
need to know whether lay citizen members trust the lawyer-judges who 
are advising them or believe that their views are being discounted by the 
professional judge. Legal practitioners need to better understand their 
impact on how lay members view the law and on how they see their 
duties to the tribunal. 
D.  The Research and Survey 
To answer these and other questions, the Author undertook the 
first survey study of lay members of Alaska’s adjudicatory tribunals.37 
On a practical level, the study was feasible. The population of Alaska lay 
members is small, well within the capacity of a single researcher to 
contact. The Governor’s Office gave permission to contact current 
 
 37.  The study was inspired by the disparity between the structurally similar 
United States administrative tribunals and the mixed courts of modern Europe. 
In theory, lay members of European mixed courts serve similar purposes to the 
jury in American courts. Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 LAW & 
SOC. SCI. REV. 275, 278 (2008). On European mixed courts, lay members restrain 
the arbitrary exercise of state power by the professional members of the court, 
legitimate court decisions by representing the local community, and widen the 
outlook of professional judges by informing them of community values. DORIS 
MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE POLITICS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM xiii (1979); JOHN P. RICHERT, WEST GERMAN LAY JUDGES: 
RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 9–10 (1983); Sonja Kutnjak Ivković, An 
Inside View: Professional Judges’ and Lay Judges’ Support for Mixed Tribunals, 25 L. & 
POL’Y 93, 96 (2003); Stephan Machura, Interaction Between Lay Assessors and 
Professional Judges in German Mixed Courts, 72 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 451, 465–66 
(2001). Lay participation can lend legitimacy to tribunals through its 
independence from royal power or the powerful state. See Ivković, supra, at 95. 
The responsibilities of European lay judges have been desribed as falling into 
two categorical functions—”a control function (influencing the courts) and a 
legitimation function (contributing to the acceptance of court decisions and to 
the trust of the public in the legal system).” Machura, supra, at 452 n.4 (emphases 
omitted). 
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members of administrative tribunals throughout the state. The Office of 
Administrative Hearings and other boards and commissions were 
supportive of the study. Resources for independent, anonymous, and 
confidential collection of survey data were available through the 
University of Nevada’s Center for Research Design and Analysis. 
Additional support was provided by the University of Alaska 
Anchorage Justice Center. 
After obtaining Office of Human Research Protection approval,38 a 
twelve-page survey was distributed to every member identified on the 
Boards and Commissions roster as holding a lay seat on forty-five 
Alaska state administrative tribunals adjudicating legal disputes as of 
July 1, 2011. The survey was announced by email and paper mail on 
September 22, 2011, with an access code to enter the website; paper 
survey booklets were distributed October 25, 2011. 
E.  Survey Response 
Of the 270 members surveyed, 156 participants returned 
substantially complete surveys, amounting to a 57% response rate. As 
the survey included over 100 items, the response rate alone was an 
indicator of the desire of lay members to be heard on these issues. 
Protection of participant anonymity was a primary concern that 
limited the data collected.39 The study relied on the accuracy of 
participant self-reports.40 
 
 38.  Because the research was conducted by University of Nevada Reno and 
involved human participants, it complied with University policies on social 
science research and federal law to ensure that the rights and welfare of research 
participants were protected. In a survey exploring individual experience, part of 
that protection is the assurance of anonymity and confidentiality. In accordance 
with the consent agreement of the survey respondents, the Office of Human 
Research protocols, and the grant of permission by the Governor’s Office, the 
original data and booklets remain in the secure, confidential custody of the 
University of Nevada Reno, but a copy of the anonymous data file will be 
deposited at the Alaska Justice Survey Analysis Center at the University of 
Alaska Anchorage. 
 39.  For example, instead of asking participants to identify their tribunal, the 
survey asked them to identify the general subject matter of their tribunal and the 
decision-making model their tribunal used. Even together, these categories were 
so general that it is impossible to identify any single participant. 
 40.  All data reported in this Article was supplied as an anonymous, coded 
electronic file to the Author by the University of Nevada Reno’s Center for 
Research Design and Analysis. All statistical relationships reported in this 
Article were established using IBM’s data analytics software, Statistical Program 
for the Social Sciences version 20 (SPSS-20). The Alaska Law Review does not have 
access to these confidential files; more information can be obtained from the 
Author by request. 
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Participation in the survey was broadly representative of lay 
members, drawing respondents from every subject area, type of tribunal 
practice, and geographical area of Alaska. Respondents’ tribunal subject 
matter areas were most commonly described as individual disputes 
related to work, including occupational licensing (48.1%); followed by 
other conduct or activities (22.4%); public regulation, including utilities, 
labor standards, and elections (21.2%); and use of public resources and 
lands (8.3%).41 The results of respondents’ choices among the decision-
making practices of their tribunals are set out in Table B in the 
Appendix.42 
Geographically, the respondents’ residence approximated the 
distribution of Alaska’s working age population.43 Communities under 
6,000 inhabitants were slightly over-represented (26.9%), while small 
towns of 6,000 to 30,000 inhabitants (14.1%) and towns of up to 60,000 
inhabitants (12.2%) were slightly under-represented. The Municipality 
of Anchorage (42.3%) was almost equal to its share of the state’s 
working age population.44 
F.  Survey Respondents 
Survey respondents were predominately male, white, long-time 
Alaskans, well-educated, employed, and over forty-five years old. Men 
outnumbered women almost two to one overall; in only one subject area 
(individual disputes related to work) did men drop below 60% of the 
respondents—to 58%.45 The respondents to the question about race 
overwhelmingly identified themselves as white (89%), and only 7% 
 
 41.  See infra Table A for the number of responses and category descriptions. 
 42.  See infra Table B for the deliberation practice descriptions that 
participants could choose. 
 43.  Geographic distribution was based on responses to a question that first 
asked if the respondent lived in the Municipality of Anchorage. If the 
respondent answered “No,” the respondent was prompted to write in a 
“community of residence.” Three survey respondents did not respond to the 
question whether they lived in the Municipality of Anchorage (1.9 %), and four 
respondents, after indicating they did not live in the Municipality of Anchorage, 
did not indicate a community of residence, so percentages do not add up to 100. 
See infra Table C. 
 44.  According to the Alaska Department of Labor Research and Analysis 
Division website, which publishes population data from the 2010 census, 194,901 
(42%) of the 467,915 Alaskans aged 18 to 64 reside in the Municipality of 
Anchorage. DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., ALASKA POPULATION OVERVIEW: 
2010 CENSUS AND 2011 ESTIMATES (2012), available at 
http://labor.state.ak.us/research/pop/estimates/pub/1011popover.pdf 
[hereinafter CENSUS]. 
 45.  See infra Table A. By comparison, in the 2010 census, women made up 
47.9% of the adult population of Alaska. Id. 
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identified themselves as Alaska Natives, American Indians, Native 
Hawaiian, or First Nations.46 Most respondents had lived in Alaska long 
enough to experience significant social or historical change.47 The 
median time of residence in Alaska was thirty-five years, and fewer than 
20% had lived in Alaska twenty years or less.48 Respondents were highly 
educated: 58% had a master’s degree, professional licensure, or master 
craftsman’s certificate or higher.49 Most respondents (73%) said they 
were employed full time, or were seeking full-time employment.50 
Finally, 49% of respondents were forty-six to sixty years old, 27% were 
sixty-one to seventy years old, 14% were forty-five years old or younger, 
and 8% were over seventy years old.51 
 
 46.  In the 2010 census, those identifying themselves as wholly or partly 
Alaska Native consisted of 19.5% of Alaska’s population. Id. In the survey, 
respondents were invited to “check all that may apply.” Only six respondents 
indicated they preferred not to say. 
 47.  For a general overview of the social and economic change in Alaska 
between 1965 and 2000, see LINDA LEASK, MARY KILLORIN & STEPHANIE MARTIN, 
TRENDS IN ALASKA’S PEOPLE AND ECONOMY (2001) (explaining how Alaska’s 
Native population doubled between 1970 and 2000, Alaska’s total population 
rose 30% from 1980 to 1985, and has grown 76% since 1980). Respondents who 
resided in Alaska more than thirty years would have experienced the economic 
boom that followed the opening of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the recession that 
followed the crash in oil prices between 1986 to 1989, and the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill of 1989. See id. 
 48.  See infra Table D. 
 49.  See infra Table E. The survey inquiry on educational attainment was not 
limited to academic degrees. Some tribunals require specific vocational 
experience or licensure that does not require a university degree, such as 
“Master Pilot.” Levels of vocational expertise were ranked alongside academic 
degrees based on years of preparation and examination. As a comparison, less 
than 10% of Alaskans over twenty-five years old have a master’s degree or 
higher academic degree. American Community Survey: 2008-2012 5 Year Data, 
ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., 
http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/cen/acsarea.cfm (select Geographic Area 
“Alaska”; then follow “Next” hyperlink; select “School/Education Attainment”; 
then follow “Next” hyperlink). In this sense, tribunal members are not 
representative of the general Alaska population. 
 50.  See infra Table F. 
 51.  Some respondents declined to answer the question, so the percentages 
do not equal 100. See infra Table F. While a true median cannot be calculated 
from the data, it is clear that Alaska’s general population is much younger than 
the respondents to this survey. Alaska’s median age is around thirty-four years 
old and only 10% of the total Alaskan population is sixty-two years or older. 
CENSUS, supra note 44. 
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II. SURVEY FINDINGS 
A.  Participation by Women and Minorities 
Appointees to boards and commissions are not drawn at random 
from the general population. In that sense they are not required, as a 
jury is, to be selected from a pool that represents a fair “cross-section of 
the community” of state citizens.52 However, tribunal appointments are 
subject to the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause, despite their 
discretionary nature.53 Most appointees are selected from regulated 
industries54 and occupations,55 resulting in a relatively small pool of 
qualified potential members.56 Further, appointments can be 
burdensome, which may lead some qualified recruits to decline. 
Appointed members volunteer time to prepare for and attend hearings 
for little or no pay. Appointed members must also travel—85% of 
 
 52.  Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 580 (Alaska 1973) (quoting 
Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 898 (Alaska 1971)). In Palmer v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003), the court majority described the distinctive 
qualities of administrative tribunals: 
Unlike a jury, its constituent representative makeup was specified. And 
as an administrative agency, it differs fundamentally from a jury: it has 
repeat business and collective expertise; its members bring individual 
expertise and different professional perspectives that would probably 
preclude them from sitting as jurors if a jury were somehow trying 
Palmer’s claim; and it even has some policy-setting capability entitling 
it to deference when it uses its expertise to interpret its enabling 
provisions. 
Id. at 841. 
 53.  Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 105 (1989). Cf. Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d 
687, 691 (Alaska 1994) (holding three-year durational residency requirement for 
candidacy for local elective office subject to “rigorous scrutiny under . . . the 
equal rights clause of the state constitution”). 
 54.  Some of the boards and commissions these appointees serve on include: 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, Big Game Commercial Services Board, 
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Housing Finance Corporation, 
Natural Resources Conservation and Development Board, Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission, Regulatory Commission of Alaska, and Workers’ 
Compensation Board. 
 55.  Some of the boards and commissions these appointees serve on include: 
Board of Public Accountancy, Bar Association Board of Governors, Board of 
Marine Pilots, State Medical Board, and Professional Teaching Practices 
Commission. 
 56.  The pool for boards and commissions that require geographic 
diversity—including the Board of Parole, ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.020(e) (2012), and 
the Workers’ Compensation Board, § 23.30.005(a)—is further limited by the 
uneven distribution of Alaska’s population, which is concentrated in the Third 
Judicial District. ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., FACT SHEET: ALASKA 
TRIAL COURT CASE FILING STATISTICS, 2005-2012 1 (2013), available at 
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ajsac/2013/ajsac.13-04.trial_courts.pdf. 
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respondents reported traveling by commercial or charter aircraft to 
attend a hearing or meeting of their tribunal at least once in the last two 
years.57  
B.  Impact of a Lack of Diversity 
The lack of diversity among appointed members was troubling to 
some respondents.58 About 38% of respondents indicated a lack of 
satisfaction with the diversity of their tribunal, but of these, 14.9% 
expressed rather mild dissatisfaction, agreeing that their commission 
“has some ethnic and gender diversity, but could be more diverse.” 
Sixty-two percent were satisfied that their tribunal represented the 
diversity of Alaska’s population, given the size of the tribunal. Of that 
number, a surprising 65% were residents of communities outside the 
Municipality of Anchorage. Only 51% of the Municipality of Anchorage 
residents responding to the question expressed themselves as being 
satisfied with the diversity of their tribunal, but 61% of those from large 
towns, 76% of those from small towns, and 73% of those from rural 
communities with less than 3,000 residents were satisfied. These high 
satisfaction numbers occur despite the reported dominance of white 
males on most tribunals, making it seem as if only a little diversity or 
regional mix satisfies most members. Nonetheless, the low percentage of 
Alaska Native (7%) or other minority respondents59 presents a 
disturbing picture of the participation of Native or other minority 
citizens in state administrative justice. 
One group of respondents stood out, however, as sensitive to the 
lack of diversity. Sixty participants reported they were motivated to seek 
appointment by a desire to advance non-partisan goals, or to improve 
the practice of a profession. This group tended to be less satisfied with 
the diversity of their tribunals to a small, but statistically significant 
 
 57.  Air travel problems disproportionately affected Alaska Native or 
American Indian attendance at hearings or meetings, with 40% of Alaska Native 
or American Indian respondents reporting that air travel problems prevented 
attendance “sometimes” or “often,” but only 9.5% of white respondents 
reporting that air travel problems prevented attendance as frequently. 
 58.  See infra Table G for the number of responses to this question by 
community population and gender of the respondents. 
 59.  Only eleven respondents described themselves as Alaska Natives, 
American Indian, or Native Hawaiian. Of those respondents, one person also 
chose “other,” so was included in that category. Only one other respondent 
chose more than one category. Among the remaining respondents, two chose 
“Latino or Hispanic;” one chose Asian; one chose African American; and four 
chose “other.” The majority (133) chose “white,” while only six chose “prefer not 
to say.” 
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degree.60 No other reason for applying for a tribunal correlated with 
respondents’ dissatisfaction with their tribunals’ diversity. 
It seems the method of recruitment may play a role in the lack of 
diversity among appointees. Respondents were asked how they first 
learned of the vacancy on their tribunal. Over 34% percent of 
respondents were recruited by a fellow professional or non-partisan 
interest group member, and 32.7% of respondents were recruited by a 
member of the tribunal or a state employee connected to it. Only 6.4% of 
respondents first saw the vacancy on the State’s Boards and 
Commissions website, suggesting that very few members are “self-
recruited.” Among Alaska Native or American Indian respondents, 40% 
indicated that business or family connections first suggested they apply 
for a vacancy, but the total numbers of Native respondents are so small 
that further research would be needed to attach any statistical 
importance to them. 
In addition, repeat appointments appear to be common.61 A 
recognized danger of having recruitment conducted by professional 
groups, interest groups, and current tribunal members is that the 
tribunal may continue to reflect the status quo. A less obvious danger 
was uncovered in this survey, which is that there appears to be a 
statistically significant correlation between persuasion to volunteer for a 
second term and a negative perception of the tribunal experience.62 
The impact of current recruitment methods can also be seen in the 
distribution of women on tribunals. Female respondents were slightly 
more likely to report they were first recruited through a political contact 
than were male respondents,63 or through a non-partisan interest or 
 
 60.  The mean value of satisfaction for those who selected the motivation 
“desire to advance non-partisan goals or improve practice of profession” was 
lower (3.03 on a one-to-four scale) than the mean value of all those who did not 
select that motivation (3.47). The format for such comparisons (Mann-Whitney U 
Test) is: Md = 3.03, n = 57; Not selected, Md = 3.47, n = 91, U = 2009.00, z = 
−2.654, p = .008, r = .21. Similarly, those motivated to apply for a vacancy by a 
desire to improve the lot of disadvantaged Alaskans were less likely to feel their 
service was important to improving life in Alaska. Selected motivation, Md = 
2.92, n = 13; Not selected, Md = 3.52, n = 143, U = 554.50, z = 2.723, p = .006, r = 
.21. Perhaps this group’s dissatisfaction reflects disappointment in the ability of 
the tribunal to make or cause change. 
 61.  Slightly more than half of respondents (52%) indicated they had served 
more than one term on their tribunal. 
 62.  Persuaded second-term membership was correlated with reports of less 
likelihood to report ample opportunity to ask questions in deliberation and more 
likelihood of reported disrespect by attorneys, tribunal staff, or other tribunal 
members. A statistical correlation does not mean that the second-term members 
themselves are more likely to experience negative events; the correlation was to 
the frequency of events that members were willing to report. 
 63.  Women = 22%; men = 14%. “Other” responses with text references to the 
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professional group,64 but the differences were not statistically 
significant. Fewer women than men have served more than one term.65 
When they served a second term, women were less likely than men to 
attribute their decision to persuasion by a professional/interest group or 
state agency.66 Fewer women than men were offered formal training 
after their appointment, but the proportional difference was not large.67 
Female respondents were less likely to be required to attend hearings as 
members of their tribunal.68 Finally, female respondents were markedly 
underrepresented on boards and commissions whose members hear 
evidence directly, suggesting that women were not as vigorously 
recruited for those positions.69 
C.  Impact of Women and Minorities 
Does the lower number of women serving on tribunals make a 
difference? Some findings in this survey suggest that it may. To a 
statistically significant degree, women respondents were more likely to 
endorse “willingness to compromise, ability to negotiate,” as a skill that 
is very important to being a successful tribunal member.70 Not 
surprisingly, there was a statistically significant negative correlation 
between endorsement of the compromise-negotiate ideal and frequency 
of outcome disagreement—that is, the greater the endorsement of the 
ideal, the less frequently the respondent disagreed with the ALJ on the 
 
Governor’s office were included as being recruited through a political contact. 
Men were more likely to report a “political” motivation for seeking 
appointment, either to serve in the appointing administration, or to gain 
community recognition. 
 64.  Women = 39%; men = 34%. 
 65.  Of those respondents who served a second term, 67% were men and 
33% were women. 
 66.  The numbers include text responses reflecting agency pressure or 
concern. Of those reporting this influence, only 1.7% were women. The numbers 
are very small, so no statistical significance should be attached. 
 67.  Among women respondents, 46% reported receiving training; among 
men, 50.5% reported receiving training. 
 68.  Of respondents who reported they attend hearings as tribunal members 
(instead of reviewing decisions or proposed decisions), 77% were men, and 22% 
were women. 
 69.  When asked if they attend hearings with an ALJ to listen to evidence, 
73% of those who responded affirmatively were men, and the other 27% were 
women. 
 70.  The difference in the percentage of respondents who ascribe the greatest 
importance (six on a scale from one to six) to this ideal was significant (33% of 
men, 66% of women). A difference persisted among those scoring it as 
important, if not of highest importance: 39% of men and 28% of women chose a 
rating of five; 22% of men and only 6% of women chose a rating of four. No 
woman chose a rating below four. 
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final outcome in the case. Women respondents also gave greater 
importance to knowledge of a tribunal’s laws and regulations than did 
men.71 
Other findings cut against the willingness of women to 
compromise. Women were no more likely than men to endorse the 
importance of unanimity. Women respondents were slightly more 
inclined to endorse the role of delegate (if appointed to a designated 
seat, the member should consider the interest of the designated group / 
profession first),72 but not to a statistically significant degree. Yet, 
women endorsed the importance of “overall fairness, open-mindedness, 
freedom from prejudice” as a member qualification at a higher rate than 
did men.73 And, to a statistically significant degree, women were more 
likely than men to endorse a “legislative-constrained” attitude toward 
the law.74 
Women respondents reported greater time spent preparing for 
hearings. Respondents who reported preparing for hearings also tended 
to report a stronger sense of equality to the ALJ, lower likelihood of 
feeling their tribunal participation devalued, greater endorsement of the 
power of “principled resignation” (i.e., to “resign if no one listens to 
their suggestions”), and less belief that members should always follow 
the advice of the ALJ.75 While these attitudes were correlated with 
preparation for hearings, they were not directly correlated to gender. 
Endorsement of a “precedent-regarding” view of decision-making 
appeared correlated with the race of the respondent to a statistically 
significant degree, with white respondents ascribing greater importance 
to “follow[ing] tribunal precedent so that decisions are predictable.”76 
 
 71.  Almost 65% of women scored this ideal as six on a scale of one to six; 
only 46% of men did so. 
 72.  On a scale of one (disagree completely) to six (agree completely), 20.8% 
of women respondents endorsed the role statement at six compared to 10.2% of 
men; 17% of women endorse the statement at five compared to 10.2% of men. At 
the other end of the scale, 32.7% of men and 22.6% of women disagreed 
completely. 
 73.  About 93% of women endorsed this ideal at six (agree completely), but 
only 79% of men did so. 
 74.  The legislative-constrained attitude was reflected in this statement: 
“Decisions of [a tribunal] should follow the law as the Legislature wrote it, not 
as some member or the ALJ would like it to be.” X2 (df = 10, n = 155) = 26.706, p 
= .003, Cramer’s V = .294. 
 75.  There was also a strong correlation between advance preparation and 
participation as measured by the number of questions asked in a hearing, n = 73, 
Kendall’s tau-b = .445, p = <.001; Spearman’s rho = .501, p = <.001, but the 
number of questions asked at hearing was not otherwise directly correlated with 
increased participation. 
 76.  X2 (df=15, N=147) = 34.65, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .28. 
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Respondents who identified themselves as Alaska Native or American 
Indian tended to disagree more strongly than white respondents with 
the proposition that tribunal members were appointed for loyalty to 
certain political views.77 Minority race or ethnicity was also associated 
with more negative views of the importance of tribunal service to 
improving life in Alaska78 and of the fairness of the outcome of the last 
case decided by the respondent.79 However, Alaska Native and other 
minority respondents did not express greater dissatisfaction with the 
diversity of their tribunal than white respondents,80 nor did they report 
lower personal influence on tribunal decisions than white respondents.81 
None of the distinctions found in respondent endorsement patterns 
should be considered predictive of a member’s views in any particular 
case or on any legal issue. They are presented here as signs that a 
member’s gender, race, or ethnicity may affect a member’s experience of 
tribunal service and perception of tribunal roles.82 The survey responses 
did not suggest a perception of systematic discrimination or actual 
discrimination. Moreover, while a 57% response rate is high, the overall 
population of Alaska lay members is low, so generalizations should be 
very cautiously drawn. Based on the responses, however, current 
members agree that attention should be given to broadening recruitment 
of members, especially on tribunals with persistently low diversity. 
D.  Duties of Fairness and Impartiality 
In Keiner v. City of Anchorage,83 the Alaska Supreme Court outlined 
the requirements of administrative adjudication: due notice and full 
opportunity to be heard; a hearing consistent with the essentials of a fair 
trial; an impartial tribunal; and a complete record of the proceedings so 
that a reviewing court is able to determine that there was no substantial 
 
 77.  X2 (df=15, N=133) = 25.28, p = .046, Cramer’s V = .25. 
 78.  X2 (df=9, N=149) = 18.53, p = .029, Cramer’s V = .20. 
 79.  X2 (df=9, N=115) = 32.428, p = <.001, Cramer’s V = .31. 
 80.  Ninety percent of Alaska Native or American Indian respondents 
agreed that their tribunal membership represents the diversity of Alaska’s 
population, given the size of the tribunal; only 57% of white respondents agreed 
with the statement. 
 81.  The most frequently endorsed measure of personal influence for Alaska 
Native or American Indian (30%) and white respondents (36%) was, “When 
particular issues come up, I often influence the outcome.” 
 82.  See Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Gender, Judging and Job 
Satisfaction, 17 FEMINIST L. STUD. 79, 88–96 (2009) (studying the various factors 
that affect work satisfaction for both male and female Australian magistrate 
judges). 
 83.  378 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1963). 
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failure to observe applicable rules of law and procedure.84 In other 
words, a fair hearing before a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
administrative adjudication.85 “Not only is a biased decision-maker 
constitutionally unacceptable[,] but our system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”86 Due 
process requires that a person have the “opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful, impartial hearing.”87 While Alaska’s Executive Branch 
Ethics Act bars unethical conduct by members of boards and 
commissions generally,88 the tribunal member’s duty of impartiality in 
administrative hearings is embodied elsewhere in the Alaska Statutes: 
The functions of hearing officers and those officers 
participating in decisions shall be conducted in an impartial 
manner with due regard for the rights of all parties and the 
facts and the law, and consistent with the orderly and prompt 
dispatch of proceedings. These officers, except to the extent 
required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by 
law, may not engage in interviews with, or receive evidence or 
argument from, a party, directly or indirectly, except upon 
opportunity for all other parties to be present.89 
 
 84.  Id. at 409–10. 
 85.  See State v. Lundberg Pac. Const. Co., 603 P.2d 889, 895 (Alaska 1979) 
(citing In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 774 (Alaska 1978)). 
 86.  Id. at 896 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
 87.  Stevens v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 257 P.3d 1154, 1160 
(Alaska 2011) (citing Thorne v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1329 
(Alaska 1989). 
 88.  The Alaska Statutes provide: 
Unethical conduct is prohibited, but there is no substantial impropriety 
if, as to a specific matter, a public officer’s (1) personal or financial 
interest in the matter is insignificant, or of a type that is possessed 
generally by the public or a large class of persons to which the public 
officer belongs; or (2) action or influence would have insignificant or 
conjectural effect on the matter. 
ALASKA STAT. § 39.52.110(b) (2012). Section 39.52.120(b)(4) prohibits board and 
commission members from taking or withholding “official action in order to 
affect a matter in which the public officer has a personal or financial interest.” In 
addition, title 9, section 52.020 of the Alaska Administrative Code states “[a] 
public officer may not take or withhold official action on a matter if the action is 
based on an improper motivation.” ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 9, § 52.020 (2012). 
Improper motivation is defined as “a motivation not related to the best interests 
of the state, and includes giving primary consideration to a person’s (A) kinship 
or relationship with a public officer; (B) financial association with a public 
officer; (C) potential for conferring a future benefit on a public officer; or (D) 
political affiliation.” tit. 9, § 52.990(b)(4). The term “public officers” includes 
members of state boards and commissions. ALASKA STAT. § 39.52.960(21)(B). 
 89.  § 44.62.630. 
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The survey explored respondents’ thoughts about fairness and 
impartiality in different contexts. First, respondents were asked to 
indicate on a six-point scale how important “overall fairness, open-
mindedness, [and] freedom from prejudice” was to being a successful 
tribunal member. All but one respondent scored this trait at five or 
higher, and 84% scored it at six.90 No other ideal trait was scored higher 
by so many respondents. The ideal of “impartiality, avoidance of conflict 
of interest” was scored at six by 78% of respondents, at five by 18% of 
respondents, and at four by 3%. Finally, the ideal of “courtesy, respect to 
parties and other members” also scored very high, with 95% of members 
choosing five or above. Clearly, the vast majority of respondents 
endorse the ideal of lay members being fair, impartial, and respectful 
toward other participants. 
Another question asked respondents for their degree of 
disagreement or agreement with a role statement about impartiality. 
“Citizen members should be fair and impartial in deciding cases, 
regardless of their personal politics or other personal views.” Of the 96% 
who responded to this question, 85% agreed completely and selected 
six. Another 12% of respondents agreed strongly and selected five. To 
gauge how much personal responsibility the respondents accepted for 
the fairness of the tribunal, the survey asked respondents if they agreed 
that they were “just as important as the administrative law judge in 
making fair decisions.” Here, the respondents were less enthusiastic – 
only 56% agreed completely, and 27% agreed strongly that they had 
equal responsibility for fair decisions. 
When asked about the decisions of their board or commission, 
however, members seemed to recognize that “fairness” as a substantive 
outcome was not always possible. When asked if they agreed that, in the 
context of tribunal decisions, “It is important to make sure the tribunal 
decisions are fair to the parties and have a just outcome, on terms the 
parties can accept,” only 34% of respondents agreed completely by 
selecting six. Indeed, 16% of respondents disagreed with that statement. 
Nonetheless, substantive justice appears to be a goal of most members. 
When asked if they agreed that “making a just decision is sometimes 
more important than following the strict letter of the law,” only 28% of 
respondents disagreed with the statement, while 18% agreed 
completely. 
Finally, to test the respondents’ awareness of procedural and 
substantive fairness in a concrete instance, respondents were asked two 
very general questions about the last decision they made as a tribunal 
 
 90.  See infra Table J for the scores on desirable traits, skills and abilities. 
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member: “How fair was the outcome?” and “How just and impartial 
was the hearing and decision-making process?”91 The results were not 
surprising: 89% of respondents said the outcome was “very fair,” and 
86% of respondents said the process was “very just and impartial.” 
The survey reveals that almost all lay members responding ascribe 
to an ethic of being “fair and impartial” decision-makers. A large 
majority accept that they bear responsibility equal to the professional 
judge with respect to the fairness of their tribunal’s decisions. 
Furthermore, a large majority understands the distinction between the 
fair hearing and decisional process and a fair or just outcome. Clearly, 
the respondents want to be fair and impartial decision-makers. 
However, as discussed in the next section, disappointingly few 
appointees receive training in decision-making. 
E.  Lack of Training in Decision-making 
Although most respondents (74%) considered the recruitment 
process successful or very successful in identifying well-qualified 
appointees, very few survey respondents (5%) considered new members 
well-prepared for service. Most respondents agreed that new appointees 
were only “somewhat prepared” (51%) or “not at all prepared” (21%). 
Yet, only 18% of all respondents received formal training in hearing 
procedure or decision-making from any source. About half of all 
respondents (49%) reported that they received some training in 
adjudication, hearing procedure, or decision-making after their 
appointment, which was usually informal training (67%). Informal 
training was given by agency staff, hearing officers, or ALJs. Only 13% 
of all respondents reported they had received training from outside 
professionals, like the Attorney General’s Office. The Alaska Attorney 
General’s Office maintains a web-based training site with specific 
information on the Executive Branch Ethics Act and provides in-person 
training for state boards and commissions,92 but the low number of 
positive responses suggests that few boards and commissions take 
advantage of this service. 
When provided, training has an impact. Respondents who received 
training reported overwhelmingly (97%) that training helped them “do a 
better job.” Members who received training were more likely to agree 
 
 91.  To avoid identification of the respondent or the decision, respondents 
were not asked any information about the decision itself. 
 92.  Executive Branch Ethics, STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, 
http://www.law.alaska.gov/doclibrary/ethics.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
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completely that it was an honor to serve on a tribunal,93 suggesting that 
training enhanced their understanding of the importance of the task. In 
addition, members with training more frequently considered the 
hearing and decision-making process in their last hearing very fair and 
impartial than did those without training.94 
The provision of training had a larger impact on women’s 
satisfaction with the overall tribunal experience. Among female 
respondents who received training, 83% reported a “better than 
expected” or “much better than expected” experience. Among women 
without training, only 45% reported a “better than expected” or “much 
better than expected” experience. Training was not associated with an 
appreciable difference in satisfaction among men. But both men and 
women with training reported a slightly higher frequency of serving a 
second term. Among men, 52% of second-term respondents had training 
and, among women, 56% of second-term respondents had training.  
The lack of immediate formal training was especially apparent in 
one question. When hearings are delegated to an ALJ, tribunal members 
have the right to attend.95 The survey asked respondents if they 
attended tribunal hearings with an ALJ to listen to evidence.96 If 
respondents answered “no,” the survey asked if the respondent had 
ever asked to attend, with responses permitted for “yes,” “no, because I 
 
 93.  Mann-Whitney U tests demonstrated the statistical significance of the 
difference in scores between those who received training (Md = 5.53, n = 77) and 
those who did not receive training (Md = 5.22, n = 79), U = 2285.500, z = −2.466, 
p = .014, r = .20. 
 94.  Ninety percent of those with training (formal or informal) rated the 
hearing and decision-making process in their last decision reached as “very just 
and impartial,” while 83% of those without training rated the process as “very 
just and impartial.” 
 95.  The Alaska Statutes provide: 
The agency may, with materials transmitted under (b) of this section, 
request the chief administrative law judge to permit the individual, 
board, or commission that will make the final decision to participate 
with the assigned administrative law judge in the conduct of the 
administrative hearing. The chief administrative law judge shall 
determine the degree and manner of participation and may terminate 
that participation at any time. However, the individual, board, or 
commission that participates under this subsection may not serve as the 
administrative law judge or preside during the hearing and may not 
take action on behalf of the agency in the agency’s capacity as a party to 
the proceedings. 
ALASKA STAT. § 44.64.060(c) (2014). 
 96.  Responses were as follows: Yes = 80; No = 66; Do not know = 9. Later in 
the survey, respondents were asked if they attended hearings, without the “to 
listen to evidence” qualification, because some tribunals may have hearings 
largely limited to argument over documentary evidence. 
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did not know I could ask to attend,” “no, although I knew I could ask to 
attend,” and “not sure.” The number of participants who were unaware 
of the right to ask to attend evidentiary hearings was surprisingly high: 
thirty-five of the sixty-six members who stated they did not attend 
hearings to listen to evidence were unaware of their right to ask to 
attend. 
Respondents to this survey clearly desire more training. Of 
respondents who had not received training, they most frequently 
requested further training in “legal issues in hearing process, decision-
making, or logic.” Training on the history and past decisions of the 
tribunal was requested by 19% of respondents; training about technical 
aspects of hearings, handling unrepresented persons, preserving the 
record, safety, etc., was requested by 15% of untrained respondents; and 
only 5% wanted training about advances in the field of tribunal 
responsibility. Comments by respondents included requests for training 
on specific subjects, “background on current issues” of the tribunal, 
“Legal Theory training,” “terminology used,” and “all of the above plus 
training about the . . . regulation.” The survey uncovered no 
disadvantage to providing members with training.97 That 50% of 
respondents desired training in “legal issues in the hearing process, 
decision-making, or logic” strongly implies that at least some members 
felt disadvantaged because they lacked such training.  
F.  Impact of Perceived Disrespect 
Despite the requirement that a fair hearing be “consistent with the 
essentials of a fair trial,”98 procedural rules in administrative 
proceedings are meant to be less formal than court proceedings.99 
Typically, administrative hearings are conducted in less formal 
surroundings as well. Informality does not excuse a lack of respect by or 
 
 97.  Only one commenter suggested that training was not needed, saying, 
“Learning the process isn’t difficult if you listen to what is going on and ask 
appropriate questions in the meeting.” 
 98.  Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 409–10 (Alaska 1963). 
 99.  See, e.g., § 21.06.210(c) (“Formal rules of pleading or evidence need not 
be observed at a hearing.”); § 21.39.170(b) (“Nothing contained in this chapter 
may require the observance at a hearing of formal rules of pleading or 
evidence.”); § 23.30.135 (“In making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a 
hearing the board is not bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or 
by technical or formal rules of procedure . . . .”); § 28.05.141(a) (“Hearings must 
be informal, and technical rules of evidence do not apply.”); § 42.05.151(b) 
(“Technical rules of evidence need not apply to investigations, pre-hearing 
conferences, hearings, and proceedings before the commission.”); § 44.62.460 
(“The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to 
evidence and witnesses.”). 
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for the tribunal members. The Code of Hearing Officer Conduct requires 
the presiding officer to “show patience, dignity, and courtesy to all 
parties, their representatives, witnesses, and others with whom the 
hearing officer or administrative law judge deals in an official capacity,” 
and to “require similar behavior from parties and their 
representatives.”100 Results from this survey suggest that tribunals 
sometimes fall short of the ideals of collegial courtesy and respect for 
members. 
A striking result was that only 29% of respondents to the question 
indicated that they were “always” formally thanked for their service 
following a hearing or deliberation. In light of the widespread adoption 
by courts of statements to jurors of respectful appreciation for their 
service upon discharge, such a failure to thank lay members for their 
attentive service on the record suggests that tribunals do not adequately 
value the members’ service or respect the individuals who serve on the 
tribunals. 
To examine how certain events affect perceptions of fairness, 
statistical correlations between measures of satisfaction with the tribunal 
and frequency of certain events experienced by respondents were 
explored.101 The survey found that negative correlations between 
satisfaction and negative tribunal support experiences are more 
prevalent and stronger than positive correlations between satisfaction 
and positive tribunal support. The most powerful negative tribunal 
experiences describe public displays of disrespect: 
• “An attorney or witness acted like I was not even there or only 
talked to the ALJ.” 
• “I observed staff or ALJ show disrespect or unfairness toward 
proceeding parties or tribunal members.” 
Another negative experience describes suppression of dissent: 
• “I did not feel like I could disagree although I wanted to 
disagree about a part of the decision.” 
The third group of negative experiences concern staff omissions 
and poor facilities: 
 
 100.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 64.030(b)(3)(E) (2012). 
 101.  This survey study did not look for causal relationships between citizen 
member attitudes and participation or other variables. No attempt was made to 
associate adjudicatory attitudes and decisional outcomes. The relationship 
between frequency of tribunal events and perceptions of satisfaction measured 
by ordinal scales (where participants chose a point on a scale from one to six, 
indicating a degree of disagreement or agreement) was examined using 
Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients, using SPSS software. 
Otherwise, for nominal measures (where there was no scale) of satisfaction or 
fairness, analysis was limited to a Kruskal Wallis H test, again using SPSS 
software. 
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• “The facilities provided for hearing or deliberation were 
substandard, too small, uncomfortable, or dirty.” 
• “A matter settled before I arrived, but no one contacted me 
before I left for the proceeding.” 
The common thread running through these experiences is a 
perceived lack of respect. The citizen member often feels disregarded, 
embarrassed by a showing of disrespect, silenced, treated poorly by 
being given dirty or uncomfortable surroundings, and forgotten. When 
a tribunal permits a member to be treated disrespectfully, the tribunal 
communicates to that member that he or she is not fully a part of the 
tribunal’s authority. 
The impact of perceived disrespect was not limited to the member’s 
sense of satisfaction with the tribunal experience. A line of negative 
correlations was identified between frequency of experiencing public 
disregard for equality of membership (“an attorney or witness acted like 
I was not even there or only talked to the ALJ”) and member satisfaction 
with how well the appointing process works, how well members are 
prepared for service, how important service is to improving life in 
Alaska, and overall satisfaction with the tribunal experience in relation 
to initial expectations. These attitudes were also negatively correlated 
with a lack of time to deliberate carefully or completely,102 staff failure to 
contact member after settlement,103 substandard, small, uncomfortable 
or dirty facilities,104 and observation of staff or ALJ disrespect toward 
parties or a member.105 In short, acts of perceived disrespect, especially 
public acts, resonate beyond the actual event. 
G.  Suppression of the Right to Dissent 
The right to express dissent from a collective decision is a key 
distinction between tribunal adjudication and one-time jury service. If 
lay members of a tribunal are truly adjudicators, they must be able to 
express their views of the evidence and tribunal law, instead of simply 
signing off on proposed decisions written by the ALJ. Practically, this 
means members should be allowed to dissent to written decisions.  
The survey results demonstrate what happens when there is no 
right to dissent. An inability to dissent (“I did not feel like I could 
disagree although I wanted to disagree about a part of the decision”) 
correlated with claims of little influence in deliberation. In contrast, 
 
 102.  This was a common experience, with 48% of respondents reporting it 
had occurred to them, although most indicated it happened “rarely.” 
 103.  About 22% of respondents reported this experience. 
 104.  About 36% of respondents reported this experience. 
 105.  Only 14.5% of respondents reported observing such actions. 
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respondents who stated that they had ample opportunity to ask 
questions in deliberation tended to have strong beliefs about their ability 
to influence the course of deliberation. The suppression of dissent also 
correlated with low assessments of procedural fairness, fewer questions 
asked at the last hearing attended, and less frequency reviewing files 
before a hearing. 
Although the effect was small, a statistically significant correlation 
existed between the view that “sometimes making a just decision is 
more important than following the strict letter of the law” and the view 
that “suppressing dissent is worrisome,” suggesting that members who 
want to dissent on grounds that the decision is unjust are being denied 
the opportunity to do so.106 A very small negative correlation nearing 
significance was found between suppression of dissent and higher 
endorsement of the ideal of active participation and communication 
with other members.107 Those members who value discussion in 
deliberation may be interrupted more frequently, or become more 
sensitive to interruption, when time is inadequate for full deliberation. 
Unfortunately, negative experiences resonated louder than positive 
experiences. A comparison between the responses of the newest 
members and those with the greatest experience revealed that the 
newest members reported fewer positive experiences than older 
members, but the most experienced members reported negative 
experiences most frequently. While there were positive statistically 
significant correlations between tribunal respect gestures and 
expressions of authority or satisfaction, all were quite small in effect. For 
example, the frequency with which respondents reported attorneys 
standing or addressing them by title correlated with the degree of the 
respondents’ perceived influence in deliberations.108 
Rather than the ALJ or hearing officer presiding over tribunal 
deliberations, a senior member frequently chairs the deliberating 
tribunal. If the chair is domineering or disrespectful to other members, 
the ALJ or hearing officer faces a difficult situation. Silence may be 
viewed as tacit approval of the chair’s tactics or position. Alternatively, 
speaking up may be viewed as partiality, an effort to sway members, a 
violation of the duty to be courteous to all members, or a subversion of 
the tribunal’s authority and decisional independence. Disrespect 
adversely impacts the tribunal’s ability to function as a fully deliberative 
body. Standards of conduct should be put in place to govern 
 
 106.  n = 142, Kendall’s tau-b = .242, p = .001, Spearman’s rho = .28, p = .001. 
 107.  n = 146, Kendall’s tau-b = −.149, p = .053; Spearman’s rho = −.160, p = 
.054. 
 108.  n = 110, Kendall’s tau-b = .17, p = .025; Spearman’s rho = .215, p = .024. 
KNUDSEN V12 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2014  6:00 PM 
64 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 31:1 
adjudications in these situations. Standards that already exist should be 
clarified and enforced.109 After all, protecting the integrity of the process 
and decisional independence of administrative adjudicators includes 
protecting the participatory rights and decisional independence of 
individual members of a tribunal. 
H.  Barriers to Active Participation 
If diversity and active citizen participation serve to legitimate 
administrative tribunals, institutional barriers such as distance, lack of 
time to prepare for hearings, lack of tribunal support, or inadequate 
facilities could adversely impact tribunal legitimacy. The survey 
findings suggested institutional barriers do have such an impact, but in 
an unexpected way. 
Surprisingly, distance, as measured by the need for air travel, was 
not a significant barrier to member participation. Only 28% of 
respondents reported that air travel problems had prevented them from 
attending a hearing or deliberation. Of those respondents, 18% indicated 
it happened “rarely.”110 Considering respondents’ frequent air travel, it 
is surprising that 89% rated this travel barrier as occurring rarely or 
never.111 Forty-five percent of respondents reported they had been paid 
per diem or travel expenses late, and 5% reported their payments were 
always late. Therefore, it came as a surprise that these factors did not 
contribute to dissatisfaction with the tribunal or affect participation in 
the decision-making process. 
 
 109.  Some standards do currently exist. For example, the Chief ALJ is 
authorized to: 
(3) foster open and clearly explained agency decisions and improve
public access to the process of administrative adjudication; (4) 
guarantee protection of all parties’ due process rights, increase the 
public parties’ perception of fairness in administrative adjudication, 
and foster acceptance of final administrative decisions by the public 
and affected parties; (5) protect the integrity of the process of 
administrative adjudication and decisional independence of 
administrative adjudicators. 
ALASKA STAT. § 44.64.020(b) (2012). 
 110.  One respondent indicated this happened “often.” 
 111.  At the time of the survey, only 18% of respondents reported they often 
or always used a video link to participate in a hearing or meeting of their 
tribunal successfully from their home community. For those with this capability, 
there was a strong positive correlation to overall satisfaction with the tribunal 
experience in relation to initial expectations (n = 146, Kendall’s tau-b = .28, p = 
<.001, Spearman’s rho = .315, p = <.001). Use of a video link was also correlated 
with likelihood of expressing differing opinions on an issue in the case, a 
measure of active participation (n = 103, Kendall’s tau-b = .23, p = .008; 
Spearman’s rho = .26, p = .007). 
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Instead, lack of time to deliberate and lack of opportunity to 
contribute had the greatest impact on members. The greatest positive 
correlation was between participation and opportunities for members to 
contribute to tribunal decision-making. These opportunities include 
ample time to ask questions during deliberation, invitations to make 
suggestions to change decision wording, and the ability to ask questions 
before the final decision is circulated. Each of these experiences offers 
tribunal members the opportunity to contribute to the decision. Higher 
participation levels were associated with more tribunal culture, 
supportive staff and facilities, reduction in travel barriers, and greater 
frequency of experiences that invite member contributions. Decreased 
participation was repeatedly associated with lack of time to deliberate 
carefully or completely, a feeling that disagreement was unwelcome, 
and absence of a draft decision to review.  
Some of the correlations were obvious. For example, the greater the 
frequency respondents were sent files to review before a hearing or 
deliberation, the more often they reviewed those files. Some correlations 
were not obvious. The frequency that attorneys demonstrated respect by 
standing or addressing members by title was positively correlated to the 
frequency of file review and the frequency of member questions at the 
member’s last hearing. A greater frequency of receiving case files in 
advance was correlated with a lower perception that the hearing officer 
dominated discussion in deliberation (i.e., talked more than the average 
member). Frequency of failure to notify respondents of a settlement 
before scheduled hearing or deliberation was negatively correlated with 
frequency of reviewing files. A similar correlation was seen between not 
being sent a draft to review (and only receiving a final decision to sign) 
and number of questions asked at the last hearing. Conversely, those 
who reported higher frequency of reviewing case files before hearings 
reported the lowest frequency of not being sent a draft to review (i.e., 
they received more drafts to review). In other words, the more the 
respondent was overlooked by the tribunal, the less the respondent 
invested in tribunal duties. 
Members preferred more opportunities to ask questions in 
deliberation. Many more respondents stated they “always” had ample 
opportunity to ask questions during deliberation (70%) than were 
“always” invited to provide input into the written decisions (30%) or 
contacted to see if they had any last minute questions (21%). This 
difference is problematic because the correlation between frequency of 
solicited input and participation occurs across forms of participation. 
For example, being sent a draft to review (soliciting written input) was 
correlated with increased frequency of questions at hearings (giving 
verbal input). Asking questions strongly correlated with length of time 
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spent preparing for hearings. Member contact for last minute questions 
before a final decision was issued was associated with a greater sense of 
influence in deliberation, which is associated with greater participation 
in other measures. Member contact for last minute questions was also 
associated with a greater importance accorded to member service on the 
tribunal. Therefore, to increase member participation, repeated 
invitations to participate in more than one way may be necessary. 
I.  Lay Members’ Understanding of Their Role 
There is no consensus on the appropriate role of lay members. 
Some believe that professional, judge-only administrative tribunals are 
most efficient and provide the best protection of the parties’ due process 
rights, and that lay members serve no useful purpose that outweighs the 
cost of their presence. Arguing against mixed courts, Professor Richard 
Lempert states that “considerable research suggests that this is hardly a 
compromise [between the judge-only court and jury-court], for 
professional judges dominate decision-making in mixed tribunals to the 
point that the benefits of lay fact-finding may be largely, if not entirely, 
lost.”112 Setting aside the assumption that the only value lay members 
bring to a tribunal is “fact-finding,” the question becomes whether the 
professional judiciary dominates the tribunal’s view of the law. In other 
words, do lay members of Alaska tribunals see themselves as juror-
substitutes, with no responsibility for interpretation of the law, or do 
they consider themselves full adjudicators whose responsibilities extend 
beyond fact-finding? If they see themselves as more than fact-finders, 
how constrained are they in acting on their understanding of the law? 
To discover what lay members think their role is on a tribunal, the 
survey asked respondents four sets of questions designed to elicit views 
of what they believe they should do, what they want to do, and what 
benefit they feel they bring to the tribunal.113 The first question set 
explored latent contributory roles, in which lay members cause indirect 
impact through other individuals’ responses to their presence on the 
tribunal, such as forcing the professional judge to explain legal concepts 
 
 112.  Lempert, supra note 9, at 484. But cf. Neil Vidmar et al., Amicus Brief, 
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 387, 387–400 (2000) (providing a 
general review of the social science scholarship on the capacity of juries to deal 
with complex questions). 
 113.  Charts showing the results are found in the Appendix. The survey also 
contained a question set asking how much respondents agreed with positively 
stated ideals (what traits, skills, or abilities a successful member should have). 
The results of this question set in context of gender differences were discussed 
supra Part II.A. 
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or encouraging community acceptance because community members 
are on the tribunal. The second set of questions asked about active 
contributions to tribunal decisions—not in terms of specific decisions, 
but in terms of general understanding of what the role of lay members 
ought to be. The third set of questions concerned lay members’ attitudes 
toward the law when making collective tribunal decisions. The last set of 
questions probed the lay members’ sense of equality and the importance 
of their contribution to the tribunal in relation to the ALJ. All questions 
asked for responses to a statement on six-point scales of complete 
disagreement (one) to complete agreement (six). 
1. Actively Protecting Alaskans’ Rights 
 
The results show that most respondents do not see their role as 
essentially passive or symbolic. The only latent contribution statement 
that more than a third of respondents agreed completely with was 
“Citizen members make sure tribunal decisions are in the best interests 
of Alaskans, instead of being whatever government ‘experts’ want.” 
This role, as a “guardian against government overreaching” was one 
that 59% of respondents completely agreed that their responsibilities 
included. A global monitoring function, typified by the statement that 
lay members “make sure that the hearing officers/ALJs do not lose sight 
of the impact of the decision on real people,” was also popularly 
endorsed, with 71% agreeing strongly or completely. Respondents also 
saw themselves as having a community representative function, with 
59% strongly or completely agreeing that lay members are generally 
more in touch with the community than hearing officers or ALJs. Those 
respondents who viewed lay members as “more in touch with the 
community” implicitly saw professional judges as less in touch with 
community values, suggesting that these respondents see themselves as 
responsible for representing the values of the community or “common 
man or woman” on the tribunal. 
2. Duty to Be Independent of the Professional Judge and Respect the 
Law as Written 
 
With respect to making decisions, the importance of the monitor 
function was again endorsed with minimal disagreement; 78% of 
respondents completely agreed that if a member “sees something wrong 
in a hearing or a decision, the member should speak up so it gets fixed” 
and only one respondent disagreed to any extent. The respondents 
overwhelmingly supported (85% agreed completely) the need to be “fair 
and impartial in deciding cases, regardless of their personal politics or 
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other personal views.” A majority (60%) disagreed that their 
responsibilities included playing the role of delegate (“If appointed to a 
designated seat, a [lay] member should consider the interest of their 
group/profession first,”) and most respondents (69%) disclaimed that 
political loyalty played a role in their decision-making. Finally, most 
respondents were willing to be critical of the legal advice they were 
given. Fifty-five percent of respondents disagreed that members “should 
always follow the advice” of the hearing officer or ALJ when it comes to 
the law, and only 13.5% of respondents agreed completely. In view of 
this openness to critical review of the law, it is not surprising that there 
was a less-than-whole-hearted endorsement of a purely fact-finding 
role: only 38% of respondents agreed completely that the most 
important part of their job is to get the facts right and decide who is 
telling the truth, although only about 13% disagreed with the statement. 
Lay members tended to view themselves as a repository of expert 
knowledge rather than pragmatic community mediators. Only about 
30% of respondents agreed completely that “sometimes the [lay] 
members’ common sense is needed to find a point where a decision 
accommodates competing community interests,” but far more (47%) 
agreed completely that lay members have “special expertise that should 
be applied when making decisions concerning their field.” 
Another question set asked about attitudes toward the law by 
asking respondents what they feel tribunal decisions should reflect. The 
responses demonstrated independence coupled with respect for the law 
as it is written by the legislature. Respondents saw little value in 
unanimity; only 21% strongly or completely agreed that a unanimous 
decision was important, while 35% disagreed strongly or completely. 
The value of independent judgment is tempered, however, by 
awareness of the constraints of law. While a majority of respondents 
agreed (18% completely, 35.5% strongly, 19% mildly) that making a just 
decision is sometimes more important than following the strict letter of 
the law, a more robust majority (48% completely, 35% strongly, 11% 
mildly) endorsed the statement that “Decisions of a board or 
commission should follow the law as the Legislature wrote it, not as a 
member or the ALJ would like it to be.” However, pragmatism won out 
over precedence. More than 63% of respondents strongly or completely 
agreed with the pragmatic view that making sure tribunal decisions are 
fair, just, and acceptable to the parties is important, but only 58% of 
respondents strongly or completely agreed that it is “important to 
follow tribunal precedent so that decisions are predictable.” 
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3. Important to a Fair Decision 
 
Finally, respondents were asked questions that probed their sense 
of equality with the professional judge. Not surprisingly, most 
respondents (56%) completely agreed they were as important as the 
professional judge in making fair decisions, and 69% completely 
disagreed that their participation in decision-making was a waste of 
state time and money. Most respondents (91%) agreed that tribunals are 
more successful if members trust the professional judge, but a lower 
majority (70%) agreed that members had the power of principled 
resignation. Although a majority of respondents disagreed that they 
should be given more respect than they are now, a surprisingly large 
percentage (36%) agreed, indicating some dissatisfaction with how 
others viewed their position. 
This Article does not include a statistical analysis of respondents’ 
attitudes because such analyses are unlikely to benefit those who 
practice before boards and commissions or who work with them. It is 
too easy to fall into the trap of viewing such analyses as predictive of a 
result in a particular case. Instead, the value of the information in this 
research lies in the degree to which respondents demonstrate that they 
think individually and independently about the law. They ascribe great 
importance to their role as fact-finders, but they do not limit themselves 
to that role. They are confident of their ability to understand the law and 
don’t rely unquestioningly on the ALJ’s interpretation. Those who 
appoint, confirm, work with, or practice before lay members of mixed 
tribunals should keep their inclination to independence in mind. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of the survey clearly demonstrate that Alaska’s lay 
members of administrative tribunals are serious, dedicated, and 
engaged members of the administrative bureaucracy. Lay members 
think about their roles in a “quasi-judicial” way, they accept 
responsibility for fair decision-making, and they ask to be respected as 
members of the tribunal. They clearly desire more training, especially in 
decision-making. They are not subservient to lawyer-judges in 
deliberation, but ask to be heard. If their participation is solicited, they 
will respond, but the solicitation may need to be repeated across forms 
of participation. 
However, these results also show the extent of problems for 
tribunals: lack of diversity, lack of consistent training, lack of clear 
standards regarding the right of members to fully participate, 
inconsistency in tribunal support for participation, and lack of a rule 
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requiring board decisions to contain an announcement of dissent for 
non-unanimous decisions. Allowing a culture of perceived disrespect 
and distrust to develop may have serious consequences for the 
substantive and procedural fairness of the tribunal. For these reasons, 
amending the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act to clarify the right 
of members to express dissent, to be present in deliberations, and to 
participate fully in deliberation would be advisable. 
Alaska’s Executive Branch Ethics Act addresses blatant conflicts of 
interest, wherein members of a board or commission stand to personally 
gain or lose something of value in a decision. Most adjudicatory boards 
and commissions in Alaska do not suffer from structural conflict of 
interest, which can occur when a board has multiple functions, such as 
deciding a claim and then paying a claim from board-administered 
funds.114 The combination of functions can create a bias where an 
oversight or regulatory board (or in-house hearing officer) favors an 
agency’s investigators or staff.115 In Alaska, few boards or commissions 
are composed of full-time appointees who exercise direct, daily 
oversight; this makes combination of functions arguments less 
persuasive because the boards are essentially part-time and the agency 
functions on a daily basis without direct oversight. In any case, 
institutional dual functionality alone does not create a conflict of interest 
sufficient to deprive a claimant of a fair hearing,116 although personal 
participation of interested staff in decision-making does so.117 
Moving to a system that divorces board members entirely from 
decision-making would deprive Alaska of the advantages of lay 
participation. However, there is no doubt that members, especially 
chairs, would benefit from education on distinguishing the various 
board functions. The practices that make a chair effective in a quasi-
legislative setting do not necessarily lend themselves to ensuring the 
full, fair deliberation of a legal dispute. Education in differences between 
 
 114.  Denmark v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 115.  Stephen R. Miller & Larry T. Richardson, A Central Panel System for 
Mississippi’s Administrative Law Judges: Promoting the Due Process of Law in 
Administrative Hearings, 6 MISS. C. L. REV. 133, 133 (1986). 
 116.  See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (holding that a 
“combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission did not 
violate petitioner’s due process rights . . . [and] did not result in a biased or 
partial tribunal”); In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 105 (1987) (noting that 
combining investigative and adjudicative functions results in no inherent 
unfairness or due process violations). 
 117.  See In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 775 (Alaska 1978) (holding that “to assure 
both the fact and appearance of impartiality in the Disciplinary Board’s 
decisional function, counsel associated with either the prosecution or defense 
should not be present during deliberations”). 
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adjudication and executive action, including structured deliberation, is 
strongly recommended to diminish the possibility of suppressing 
member contributions. 
Survey respondent satisfaction and estimates of the procedural 
fairness of the respondent’s last decision were positively associated with 
ample opportunity to ask questions during deliberation. However, 
satisfaction, procedural fairness, and substantive fairness were all 
negatively associated with suppression of dissent and inadequacy of 
time to deliberate carefully and completely. Allowing sufficient time in 
the schedule for deliberation and repeated solicitation of member 
questions on points of debate could improve both member satisfaction 
and perception of procedural fairness. For some boards and 
commissions, this may require scheduling longer conferences, more 
frequent meetings, use of video conferencing, or other procedures to 
ensure that all members have a fair opportunity to participate. 
The demographic data of respondents suggests that recruitment for 
adjudicatory tribunals needs to be broadened. Admittedly this is a 
difficult proposition, especially for designated seats. The Governor’s 
Office of Boards and Commissions has made commendable efforts to 
recruit through the State’s website, but the low use of the website as an 
“initial contact” is disappointing. State-generated publicity is generally 
limited to press announcements of appointments. Wider publication of 
opportunities to serve may generate more diverse applications. The 
Alaska Legislature could contribute as well by elevating the importance 
of its duty to review appointments. Giving more public recognition to 
current members or the adjudicatory work of tribunals, elevating the 
significance of tribunal service through legislative attention, and 
publicizing the existence of tribunals as opportunities to serve the State 
in a “quasi-judicial” capacity may attract more candidates. 
For those who practice before Alaska’s boards and commissions, 
the message is clear: there is no downside to bestowing formal respect 
toward lay members of administrative tribunals. Moreover, the 
commitment shown by respondents to the ideal of fair and impartial 
decision-making is ample reason for the bar to support structural and 
training initiatives that increase participation by lay citizens appointed 
to quasi-judicial boards and commissions. 
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TABLE J. Desirable Traits: How Important It Is for Lay Members to 
Have _____? 
1. Expertise or experience in regulated field 
 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 2 1.3 1.3 
2 5 3.2 3.2 
3 13 8.3 8.3 
4 28 17.9 17.9 
5 35 22.4 22.4 
6 73 46.8 46.8 
Total 156 100 100 
2. Impartiality, avoidance of conflict of interest 
Note: no response 
to 2, 3 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 1 0.6 0.6 
4 5 3.2 3.2 
5 28 17.9 17.9 
6 122 78.2 78.2 
Total 156 100 100 
3. Prompt, ready, and regular attendance 
Note: no 
responses to 2, 3 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 1 0.6 0.6 
4 2 1.3 1.3 
5 43 27.6 27.6 
6 110 70.5 70.5 
Total 156 100 100 
4. Ability to understand and weigh the evidence 
Note: no 
responses to 2, 3 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 2 1.3 1.3 
4 2 1.3 1.3 
5 31 19.9 20 
6 120 76.9 77.4 
Total 155 99.4 100 
No opinion 1 0.6 
Total 156 100 
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TABLE J cont’d. 
5. Knowledge of the tribunal’s laws and regulations 
 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 1 0.6 0.6 
2 3 1.9 1.9 
3 4 2.6 2.6 
4 10 6.4 6.4 
5 55 35.3 35.3 
6 83 53.2 53.2 
Total 156 100 100 
6. Active participation, communication with other members 
 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 1 0.6 0.6 
2 1 0.6 0.6 
3 3 1.9 1.9 
4 11 7.1 7.1 
5 45 28.8 28.8 
6 95 60.9 60.9 
Total 156 100 100 
7. Willingness to stick to principles, independence 
Note: no response 
to 2 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 2 1.3 1.3 
3 8 5.1 5.1 
4 13 8.3 8.3 
5 49 31.4 31.4 
6 84 53.8 53.8 
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TABLE J cont’d. 
8. Overall fairness, open-mindedness, freedom from prejudice 
Note: no response 
to 2, 3, 4 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 2 1.3 1.3 
5 23 14.7 14.7 
6 131 84 84 
Total 156 100 100 
9. Willingness to compromise, ability to negotiate 
Note: no response 
to 2 
Score # of Responses 
% of 
Total % of Responses 
1 3 1.9 1.9 
3 4 2.6 2.6 
4 24 15.4 15.5 
5 55 35.3 35.5 
6 69 44.2 44.5 
Subtotal 155 99.4 100 
No opinion 1 0.6 
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Table 4-A. Endorsement of Equal Responsibility for 
Fair Decisions
completely disagree
strongly disagree
disagree
agree
strongly agree
completely agree
